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Laying a Foundation for the Introduction of Secondary
Evidence in West Virginia
The best evidence rule, at its inception, encompassed every
aspect and type of proof, and litigants were required to produce
the very best evidence that the nature of the case would permit.
Frequently, the rule was enforced when oral evidence was offered
to prove an issue that was capable of proof in some other man-
ner.' By its very nature, the rule was capable of misuse because
of wide discretion in the court for its application. In fact misuse
of the rule caused the gradual devolution to the more narrow
rule of today. During the latter part of the seventeenth and through-
out the eighteenth centuries, when rules of evidence were shaping
into a system for use in jury trials, the best evidence rule emerged
in a narrowed form, applying only to the proof of a writing. The
original rule remained in the law as an underlying principle to
guide, but not to control, the reception of evidence. As applied
in the courts today, the best evidence rule requires that, when
one wishes to prove the contents of a writing, he must produce
the original writing or satisfactorily explain its absence before the
court will receive secondary evidence to prove the same matters.'
The general purpose of this note is to set out the various con-
ditions precedent to the introduction of secondary evidence and
to suggest ways to lay the foundation for such evidence in a West
Virginia court.
West Virginia decisions are generally in accord with the rule
as previously explained. The best evidence rule in this state ob-
tains only in cases in which one attempts to prove the contents of
a writing.3 In such cases the original writing must be produced
or its absence explained satisfactorily to the court.4 Upon satis-
factory explanation and if the evidence be not otherwise subject
to valid objection, the court will admit the secondary evidence.
The types and kinds of evidence will vary but must of necessity
be a substitute for stronger and better proof which is not presently
available.5
1 1 JONES, EvIDENcE 383 (4th ed. 1938); see also 1 JONES, EVIDENCE
§ 231 (5th ed. 1958).
2 1 GitEENLEAF, EVIDENCE 169 (16th ed. 1899).
' State v. Holbert, 137 W. Va. 883, 74 S.E.2d 772 (1953); State v.
Davis, 74 W. Va. 657, 82 S.E. 525 (1914); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 782 (1942);
20 AM. JuR. Evidence § 405 (1939).
4 State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S.E. 561 (1896).
s O'Connor v. United States, 11 Ga. App. 246, 75 S.E. 110 (1912).
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In order to introduce the secondary evidence, the practitioner
will be obliged to show the court that the primary evidence was
not available.6 The procedure here will vary according to the
particular facts of the case. For example, the original may have
been lost, or it may have been destroyed, or at least a diligent
search may have failed to produce it, or it may be in the possession
of someone over whom the court does not have jurisdiction.7 If
the original has been destroyed, then the proponent of the sec-
ondary evidence would simply establish destruction thereof by the
best evidence available, perhaps by a witness who saw the destruc-
tion take place.' If the document has been lost or allegedly
destroyed, then the person seeking the aid of the secondary evidence
need not exhaust every hypothesis of the original's whereabouts
or prove conclusively that it is no longer in existence." He need
only establish a reasonable presumption that the writing is lost
or destroyed.' Establishing such a presumption is a preliminary
question and is addressed to the sound discretion of the court."
Possession of the original by one other than a party to the
action presents another variation of the unavailability of such a
primary document. If the person holding the original is within
the jurisdiction of the court, the original should be required for the
court could compel it to be brought in. If, on the other hand, the
original is held by one residing outside the jurisdiction of the court
and the court cannot compel its production, a copy of the original.
properly authenticated, should be accepted by the court as sec-
ondary evidence. In such a case it has been held that the pro-
ponent of the secondary evidence need not show any special efforts
to get the original or to induce the holder of such evidence to bring
it into court, since the success or failure of such efforts would not
depend upon the proponent but rather upon a stranger to the action."2
When a party to the action holds documentary evidence that
another party wishes to introduce into evidence, the proponent of
that evidence must make a demand upon that party holding the
primary evidence to produce it. Such a demand must be reasonable
in respect to the time and distance factors. What is a reasonable
6 Thompson v. Coal & Coke Co., 104 W. Va. 134, 139 S.E. 642 (1927).
7 State v. Lowry, supra note 4.1 Edgell v. Conaway, 24 W. Va. 747 (1884).
9ibid.10 Ibid.
"Ibid.
'
2 Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301 (1883).
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demand is of course determined by the particular facts of the case.
A prudent practitioner would undoubtedly make the demand as
soon as he realized the need for such primary evidence. In the
case of Waddell v. Trowbridge,13 two examples merit consideration
on the question of what is or is not reasonable notice. The case,
tried in West Virginia, involved an automobile insurance policy, the
terms of which became important in the case. Defendant made a
demand for the insurance policy for the first time when the witness
was on the stand in the midst of the trial. At this time it was
learned that the policy was in Pasadena, California, and that it
could not possibly be obtained without a delay in the trial. The
defendant then sought to produce a standard form of the policy which
purported to contain the same terms as the plaintiff's policy. The
proper foundation was not laid for the introduction of secondary
evidence, for here the demand was not timely made in view of the
distance factor. Reasonable notice is a relative factor and depends
upon the facts of the individual case. 4 Without the proper effort
to procure the best evidence available in the case, secondary evi-
dence is not admissible. -In the same trial, plaintiff attempted to
introduce into evidence a carbon copy of a letter from the agent
of the insurance company to the defendant, after making a demand
at the trial for the original which defendant admitted he had re-
ceived. Defendant answered that he could not say for sure where
the original was, but that, if he had it, it was probably in his desk
at home. The trial was in progress in Charleston and the de-
fendant's residence was less than ten miles away and within reach
of the court in a short time by car or trolley, yet the original was
not produced. Under these circumstances, the court decided that
the demand for the original letter at the trial was reasonable and,
since the defendant did not produce it, the plaintiff had laid a
proper foundation and could introduce the carbon copy as sec-
ondary evidence. Related to the rules recognized in this case is
the corollary principle that denial of receipt and possession of a
letter or telegram will excuse a demand for the production thereof
as a step preliminary to proof of its contents."5
Even when the state is attempting to convict a person of
forgery and the forged instrument is in the possession of the de-
fendant or his friends, the state must show a proper demand upon
13 Waddell v. Trowbridge, 94 W. Va. 482, 119 S.E. 290 (1923).
14Burton v. Seifort & Co., 108 Va. 338, 61 S.E. 993 (1908).
15 Cobb v. Dunlevie, 63 W. Va. 398, 404, 60 S.E. 384, 386 (1908).
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the defendant or his counsel before evidence of the existence, char-
acter, and contents is admissible."6
Many of the cases pertaining to the introduction of secondary
evidence involve letters or telegrams. The usual business practice
is to make a carbon copy of the letter mailed or otherwise sent out.
How then, as a practical matter, is the foundation laid for the receipt
into evidence of a carbon copy of a letter? If the original letter is
allegedly in the hands of the party opposing the introduction of
this secondary evidence and that party denies receipt of the original,
the proponent's problem is twofold."' He must show that the
carbon copy he is offering as evidence is in fact authentic, and he
must also show that the original was received by the addressee.
Proof that the original was received by the addressee is of course
not necessary when the addressee admits receipt of the letter but
fails to produce it for some other reason.
To prove authenticity, the contents of the copy should be
viewed in relation to the facts of the issue to be resolved, and, if
the relationship is credible, the copy should be received. To estab-
lish authenticity, it is not necessary to prove the copies beyond a
reasonable doubt but only to introduce enough evidence, which,
when uncontradicted, would satisfy all reasonable minds of the
genuineness of the secondary evidence offered." In the absence
of any direct evidence, the facts to be drawn from the writing itself
may prove its authenticity. 9 Direct evidence, such as by a witness
who testifies that the carbon is an exact copy of the original sent
to the addressee, is of course preferred.
Proof of the sending of the original to the addressee must be
accomplished in accordance with the facts of the particular case.
If the letter were delivered by a messenger, the testimony of the
party who delivered the letter to the addressee should be offered
in evidence.2" The more common method of delivery is by use of
the mails, which presents a somewhat different problem. Reg-
istered or certified mail receipts are evidence that the original was
16State v. Lowry, supra note 4.
17 Rubenstein v. Ins. Co., 118 W. Va. 367, 190 S.E. 531 (1937).I Fayette Liquor Co. v. Jones, 75 W. Va. 119, 83 S.E. 726 (1914).
19 7 WiGoR, EVmENCB § 2148 (3d ed. 1940).20V hile no case authority is offered in support of this specific proposi-
tion, it seems to be a valid theory of proof when compared to W. VA. CODE
ch. 56, art. 3 § I1 (Michie 1955), which permits service of process by any
credible person. For a case on this point, see Peck v. Chambers, 44 W. Va.
270, 28 S.E. 706 (1897); W. VA. R.C.P. 4(c).
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received by the addressee, but, in the course of regular mails, such
receipts are not available. A witness may testify that he properly
addressed, stamped, and deposited the letter in the post office,"1
and, unless this evidence is objected to on valid grounds or shown
not to be credible on cross-examination of the witness,22 the pre-
sumption then obtains that the letter was in fact received. 3
Telegrams present a similar problem in proof, yet by the na-
ture of a telegram the proof that it was received is not as difficult
to establish.2" Authentication of the copy of a telegram is ac-
complished in the same manner as in the case of any letter or
copy of any record. There is an added problem in the introduc-
tion into evidence of a copy of a telegram. As has been previously
pointed out herein, the proponent of secondary evidence must
normally show the court that he has made every reasonable effort
to acquire the primary evidence before the court will hold that the
proper foundation has been established to permit the introduction
of the copy in evidence.25 What is primary evidence in relation
to a telegram? Is it the written copy delivered at the place of trans-
mission or is it the printed copy that is received by the addressee?
The answer to this question would seem to depend on which party
is responsible for its transmission, or for whom the telegraph com-
pany was acting as agent in sending the telegram. If the proponent
wishes to prove a contract by telegrams, the best evidence of this
contract is the telegram containing the offer as it was received by
the addressee and the written telegram accepting the offer as it
was delivered to the telegraph company for transmission. If there
is only one communication between the parties to the action, the
telegram as delivered to the addressee is the best evidence of what
was in that telegram. 6 Authenticity of the telegram must be shown,
whether the original or a copy is introduced in evidence, that is,
it must be shown that the purported sender of the telegram did in
fact commission the telegraph company to act as his agent in send-
ing the telegram. This may be accomplished through the testimony
of the telegraph company's agent who accepted the order to send
the telegram.2"
21 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 103 W. Va. 574, 138 S.E. 381 (1927).
22 Showalter v. Chambers, 77 W. Va. 720, 88 S.E. 1072 (1916).
23 Fayette Liquor Co. v. Jones, supra note 18, at 125.
24 52 AM. JUR. Telegraphs and Telephones §§ 117-126 (1944); Annot.,
63 A.L.R. 808 (1929).25 Thompson v. Coal & Coke Co., supra note 6.
26 Cobb v. Glenn Boom & Lumber Co., 57 W. Va. 49, 49 S.E. 1005
(1905).2 7National Bank v. National Bank, 7 W. Va. 544 (1874).
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The rules as herein discussed will suffice to lay a foundation
for the ordinary writings such as letters, telegrams and most rou-
tine papers. Copies of these writings may be made in a variety
of ways, the more common methods today being either by a photo-
graphic copying machine or by carbon copies from a typewriter.
In some jurisdictions, 8 including West Virginia, 9 carbon copies
made on a typewriter have been given special consideration as
evidence. They are considered primary rather than secondary evi-
dence, and the proponent need not lay any foundation for their
introduction in evidence. The West Virginia court held in Elias
& Bro. v. Boone Timber Co.,"0 that duly authenticated carbon
copies of such papers may be admitted in evidence as primary
evidence of the facts they contain and that the proponent of such
evidence need not explain to the court the whereabouts of the
original or even make a demand on the party supposedly holding
the original. If the copies are identified as resulting from the same
mechanical operation of the typewriter by the use of properly ad-
justed carbon papers, the court reasons that the copies could not
differ in substance and form and, in such a case, they are all
basically original writings. Thus, if any one of these copies is
admissible for any purpose, all the others are likewise admissible.
Some jurisdictions have admitted carbon copies in evidence as
originals when the carbons were signed.31 While the Boone Timber
Co. case plainly states the rule in West Virginia to be that carbon
copies may be considered as primary evidence, few, if any, sub-
sequent cases can be found in this jurisdiction which treat carbon
copies as original evidence. It would seem that the offer of such
evidence as secondary is prudent procedure and that, in the event
of some deficiency in laying the foundation for such secondary
evidence, the proponent could always rely upon this rule to get the
carbon copy into evidence. The use of this evidence as primary
does have at least one further ramification insofar as degrees of
secondary evidence are concerned. Some jurisdictions hold that
there are no degrees of secondary evidence."2 Others contend that
evidence next best after the original is the carbon copy and, after
that, oral evidence may be introduced to prove the contents of the
SAnnot., 65 A.L.R.2d 343 (1959).
29 Elias & Bro. v. Boone Timber Co., 85 W. Va. 508, 102 S.E. 488 (1920).
0 Ibid.
31 Cole v. Ellwood Power Co., 216 Pa. 283, 65 Ati. 678 (1907).
32 Baroda State Bank v. Peck, 235 Mich. 542, 209 N.W. 827 (1926).
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writing.3 Thus, if West Virginia adheres to the rule that a prop-
erly authenticated carbon copy is primary evidence, it would seem
to follow that in West Virginia there are no degrees of secondary
evidence.
The West Virginia practitioner has at least three general areas
where he needs to lay a proper foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence. If the primary evidence be outside the juris-
diction of the court, he will be obliged to show that he has made
an effort to obtain this evidence and that such effort was reason-
able in light of all circumstances in the case. If the primary evidence
be lost or destroyed, it would be well to establish the facts of
destruction by a witness to erase any doubt that the original was
in existence and to remove any shadow of fraudulent destruction
by the proponent of the secondary evidence. In a case where there
is no substantial evidence to show the disposition or location of
the original, competent evidence should be offered to establish
that a diligent search has been made and that the original can not
be located. If an adverse party holds the primary writing, sufficient
demand for its production at trial should be timely made. Reason-
ableness of the notice for production will depend upon where the
writing is located, what length of time will be required to get it
into court, and whether the proponent of the secondary evidence
made the demand as soon as he realized the need for the writing.
Notice is of course not necessary when the adverse party denies
receipt and possession of the evidence.
Rule 70 (1) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence ' succinctly
lists the elements considered necessary to a foundation upon which
secondary evidence may be received in court. Strong arguments
for uniformity in this area of the rules of evidence are readily noted.
To promote such uniformity, Rule 70 (1) is here quoted for study
and consideration by the Bench and Bar.
"As tending to prove the content of a writing, no evidence
other than the writing itself is admissible, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, unless the judge finds (a) that the
33 A majority of states has adopted the American rule which holds that
a copy of the lost writing is the next best evidence and, if it is available, the
court will not hear any oral evidence on the point. For a discussion of the
American rule see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1268 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
34 Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and approved at its annual conference, 1953. Approved by the
American Bar Association, 1953.
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writing is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent in-
tent on the part of the proponent, or (b) that the writing is
outside the reach of the court's process and not procurable
by the proponent, or (c) that the opponent, at a time when
the writing was under his control has been notified, expressly
or by implication from the pleadings, that it would be needed
at the hearing, and on request at the hearing has failed to
produce it, or (d) that the writing is not closely related to the
controlling issues and it would be inexpedient to require its
production or (e) that the writing is an official record, or is
a writing affecting property authorized to be recorded and
actually recorded in the public records as described in Rule
63, exception (19)."
Wallace Everett Maloney
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